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Rene Descartes was wrong, and Shakespeare could have told him so. 
Descartes's hard distinction between the inanimate and the merely 
living machine-matter, on the one hand, and the mind made of an 
immaterial essence, on the other, no longer convinces anyone. Since 
Charles Darwin we have accepted not a hard distinction but a continu-
ous spectrum (indeed, a chain) of complexity and sensitivity connecting 
the low-order life forms and the higher, and recently it has become 
apparent that high-order rationality too is just a sophistication of sim-
pler kinds of biological responsiveness. As Antonio Damasio has shown, 
the apparatus for thinking is built upon the simpler messaging systems 
common to animals and plants and that, essentially, we think and feel 
with our bodies and not with disembodied minds (Damasio, 1995). The 
realization of this embodiment is a key element in the recent 'affective 
turn' in cultural and literary theory, and it confirms Raymond Williams's 
strangely oxymoronic claim that in 'structures of feeling' our beliefs 
and practices - our mental and physical lives - interpenetrate one 
another (Clough and Halley, 2007; Williams, 1977, pp. 128-35). It is 
not surprising that with this closing of the gap between humans and 
all other life (lower forms around us now, and the lower forms from 
which we evolved), scientists are increasingly finding evidence that the 
behaviours we call culture, morality, and politics occur in communities 
of animals (De Waal, 1982; De Waal, 2001; Whiten, Horner and De Waal, 
2005). As the editors of this collection note in their introduction, a 'stra-
tegic move away from anthropocentric premises' is necessitated by new 
knowledge of what we have in common with animals, but this does not 
entail a rejection of all of humanism. This chapter will identify ethical 
imperatives that, for Shakespeare, seem to be built into human nature by 
certain facts of life that science is only now fully bringing to light. 
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In the 1970s the chemist James Lovelock developed an extraordinary 
hypothesis in which our planet's atmosphere is not the precondi-
tion that allowed life to develop on Earth, but is itself the pl'Oduct of 
life-forms, which made the world comfortable for themselves. This 
seemed to require that the life-forms collaborated in adjusting their 
outputs, which idea appeared so far-fetched that early research papers 
by Lovelock were routinely rejected by academic journals. Lovelock 
continued working on his hypothesis, and introduced into it the fur-
ther complexity of the chemical reactions between the atmosphere and 
l'Ock surfaces as they weathered (a process that bacteria can accelerate) 
and also the oceans full of algae. The result was a chemical model of 
a complex interconnected chain of reactions whose ultimate effect 
was to regulate the conditions on Earth for the benefit of its life-forms. 
This model he called Gaia. With the entire Earth unified in this way, 
it seems artificial to distinguish between the parts that are obviously 
alive (the biota) and the inanimate oceans, rocks and clouds. These 
inanimate parts are tightly coupled in chemical processes with the 
biota, and the proper perspective is to treat the entire Earth as a super-
organism composed of many kinds of subsidiary organisms. This idea 
Lovelock first presented in a sequence of papers (the most significant 
being Lovelock, 1972; Lovelock and Margulis, 1974a, 1974b) and then 
as a series of books (including Lovelock, 1979, 1988). 
Darwin's hypothesis showed that a chain of being unites all of life on 
Earth in a single, subtly complex, process, and Lovelock's Gaia hypoth-
esis extends this idea up to the planetary scale and down to the mere 
matter comprising the land, sea and air. In its strongest form, Gaia sees 
the whole Earth as a living organism, one that might even (in Daniel 
Dennett's deliberately pl'Ovocative phrase) have finally gl'Own a nervous 
system: us (Dennett, 2003b). In its weakest form, which shades off into 
Earth Systems Science, the Gaia hypothesis treats the Earth's chemical 
and thermodynamic processes not as life itself but as a collection of 
tightly coupled feedback loops pl'Oducing planetary homeostasis, or 
self-regulation. We see homeostasis all around us, but it can be hard to 
recognize and explain. For instance, the moon takes exactly as long to 
turn once on its axis as it does to orbit once around the Earth, which 
is why it always presents the same face to us, the face it has presented 
to millions of our ancestors. In the geocentric model of the universe 
this had been explained by the moon being fixed to a crystal sphere 
encompassing the Earth and turning with it as the sphere l'Otated. But 
once Copernicus and Galileo had worked out the correct locations 
and motions of the heavenly bodies and Isaac Newton and Johannes 
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Kepler had derived the forces governing them, the moon turning at 
just the right rate to keep its face to us looked like a celestial miracle of 
coincidence. It was almost the twentieth century before George Howard 
Darwin, Charles Darwin's son, figured out how the laws of gravity make 
the Earth-moon system self-regulating (Darwin, 1898). If we managed 
to perturb the moon, giving it an extra spin in order to see around the 
other side, it would react by turning back to show its familiar face to us, 
and solely because of gravitational forces. 
Earth Systems Science is finding self-regulation in places nobody sus-
pected before, thereby reactivating pre-Enlightenment views on matter, 
the universe and life. Shakespeare's characters debate self-regulation 
and find it at work in things we consider to be alive and in things that, 
until recently, we did not. The Earth shook at Owen Glendwr's birth, of 
that the protagonists agree. But why did it shake? Owen Glendwr says 
it was out of fear: 
GLYNDWR The front of heaven was full of fiery shapes, 
Of burning cressets; and at my birth 
The frame and huge foundation of the earth 
Shaked like a coward. 
(1 Hemy IV, IV. 1. 13-16)1 
Hotspur accepts the shaking but not the cause: 'I say the earth was not 
of my mind / If you suppose as fearing you it shook' (III. 1.20-2). At best, 
the Earth but belched or fatted at Glendwr's birth: 
HOTsPUR Diseased nature oftentimes breaks forth 
In strange eruptions; oft the teeming earth 
Is with a kind of colic pinched and vexed 
By the imprisoning of unruly wind 
Within her womb, which for enlargement striving 
Shakes the old beldam earth, and topples down 
Steeples and moss-grown towers. At your birth 
Our grandam earth, having this distemp'rature, 
In paSSion shook. 
(1 Henry IV, III.1.2S-33) 
As Edmond Malone pointed out (Shakespeare, 1821, III.1.33, n. 3), the 
same image of winds trapped in the Earth occurs in Edmund Spenser's 
The Faerie Queene (III.9.1S.2-9) and one of Shakespeare's narrative 
poems: I As when the wind, imprisoned in the ground, / Struggling 
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for passage, earth's foundation shakes' (Venus and Adonis 1046-7). But 
in Spenser's poem and Venus and Adonis the wind has agency - has a 
desire for release - and the Earth is merely its prison, a foundation to 
be shaken. Hotspur, in contrast, sees the Earth as the agent here: the 
Earth breaks wind to correct itself by relieving the build-up of internal 
pressure. 
These ideas have been an embarrassment to criticism. Shakespeare 
seems to share his characters' belief in a vital and alive universe rather 
than a mechanical one. We can tell Shakespeare's view because Hotspur 
is pricking Glendwr's pomposity, yet he does not challenge the idea 
that the Earth responded as a living creature. Hotspur merely substitutes 
flatulence for fear as the cause of this response. As late as 1765, Samuel 
Johnson was able to read Hotspur's explanation as 'a very rational and 
philosophical confutation of superstitious errour' (Shakespeare, 1765, 
III. 1.28, n. 6), meaning that Glendwr is superstitious and Hotspur's 
explanation is rational. In the notes to his 1768 edition Edward Capell 
wrote that as an explanation of earthquakes 'the Poet's physics are 
certainly right', albeit 'the dress he has put them in ... is suited to the 
mouth they proceed from' (Capell and Collins, 1779-80, p. 159). I do 
not suppose Johnson and Capell meant that they accepted Hotspur's 
image as literally true. I imagine they saw it, much as we would until 
recently, as a metaphor that comes closer to the truth than Glendwr's 
idea of a fully conscious world capable of fearing his nativity. 
Until recently, most scientists would have said that, howsoever 
metaphorical, Hotspur's explanation is unhelpful since there is noth-
ing remotely biological at work in earth tremors. Indeed, the Gaia 
hypothesis was at first resisted by Earth Systems scientists precisely 
because it seemed biological. The Gaia hypothesis now incorporates 
plate tectonics and earthquakes, and hence encompasses the phenom-
ena Hotspur tries to explain (Worsley, Nance and Moody, 1991; Berner, 
1991). Earthly exhalation is also where Gaia started, for the atmospheriC 
disequilibrium it set out to explain is the rich concentrations of oxygen 
and methane that could not co-exist for long were not living creatures 
replenishing them by respiration and falting/belching. Hotspur was 
right: the living Earth belches and dead planets do not. It might be 
objected here that atmospheric methane comes from individual organ-
isms' digestive processes not the whole Earth's. Gaia shows that this 
distinction between part and whole is false: the living Earth is its collec-
tion of parts, as is the organism. The average human has about ten times 
as many microorganisms - separate creatures with their own DNA and 
reproduction cycle - living in her digestive tract as she has cells in her 
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body, and it is these that make her farts and her belches as they break 
down her food. If we think our effluxes are our own, then we must 
accept that the Earth's are its own. 
Zoologists used to object that the Gaia hypothesis is anti-Darwinian, 
since planet-wide regulation of the atmosphere seems to imply coopera-
tion that is at odds with natural selection's privileging of the local and 
the temporary advantage. Gaia, they objected, would require organ-
isms planning ahead for their collective good, which cannot be right. 
Lovelock's answer invoked a principle that Darwinists only started to 
think carefully about since the 1960s: the environment to which an 
organism adapts is not a static background but includes the dynamic 
behaviour of other organisms, including others of its own species. 
Moreover, the environment can be altered by an organism. This last 
point is crucial, since an inheritable trait might be even more advan-
tageous to a creature's descendants than it was to the creature that 
first developed it, simply because that trait changed the environment 
against which the adaptation's usefulness is to be measured. This means 
that determining whether a trait is doing an organism some good (in 
the evolutionary sense) may be harder than it might at first seem. 
In his latest work to address how natural selection might have 
generated planet-Wide homeostasis, Lovelock explicitly puts the case 
in transgenerational terms regarding mutual interchange between an 
organism and its environment: 
[T]he first organisms must have used the raw materials of the Earth's 
crust, oceans, and air to make their cells. They also returned to their 
environment their wastes and dead bodies. As they grew abundant, 
this action would have changed the composition of the air, oceans, 
and crust into an oxygen-free world dominated chemically by 
methane. This means that soon after its origin, life was adapting not 
to the geological world of its birth, but to an environment of its own 
making. There was no purpose in this, but those organisms which 
made their environment more comfortable for life left a better world 
for their progeny, and those which worsened their environment 
spoiled the survival chances of theirs. Natural selection then tended 
to favor the improvers. (Lovelock, 2004, pp. 3-4) 
In other words, competition between, on the one hand, early organ-
isms that left the area around themselves a bit easier for their progeny 
to live in and, on the other, those that left it a bit harder for their 
progeny to live in would have favoured the former. The progeny of the 
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well-behaved had the advantage. This hypothesis does not fall foul of 
the fallacy of group selection, as Richard Dawkins claimed when he 
objected that Gaia requires the kind of selflessness that natural selection 
destroys because 'a mutant plant which saved itself the costs of oxygen 
manufacture ... would outreproduce its more public-spirited colleagues' 
(Dawkins, 1982, p. 236). Rather, Gaian natural selection is now taken 
seriously by mainstream Earth Systems Science (Lenton, 1998). 
Of course, Elizabethans had no direct access to any such inSights. But 
in the theologically centred morality of Shakespeare's time the ethic 
of reciprocity embodied in the Christian Golden Rule - 'do to others 
as you would have them do to you' (Matthew 7.12) - was obviously a 
component of interactions within the family, or within a community, 
01' between natives and strangers. Shakespeare repeatedly dramatized 
how morality emerges from such interactions, both within a genera-
tion and, crucially for my argument, across generations of descendants. 
The Golden Rule seems to govern social interactions within a single 
generation - the 'others' are those around you now - while natural 
selection required for Gaia occurs trans-generationally and is concerned 
with behaviours whose impacts upon evolutionary fitness can only be 
discerned over time. Shakespeare on occasion addresses such Gaian 
interactions, by dramatizing selfish behaviour that seems advantageous 
to the individual considered synchronically but, when considered dia-
chronically, trans-generationally, is revealed as disadvantageous. He was 
aware that if one's behaviour is inherited by one's children, one faces 
a kind of Golden Rule played out over time and hence, in crude but 
I think defensible terms, heredity encourages goodness. 
The earliest example of this principle in Shakespeare's work is Lady 
Anne's curse on Richard Gloucester, in which she imagines him having 
a child as monstrous as himself: 
LADY ANNE If ever he have child, abortive be it, 
Prodigious, and untimely brought to light, 
Whose ugly and unnatural aspect 
May fright the hopeful mother at the View, 
And that be heir to his unhappiness. 
(Richard III, 1.2.21-5) 
John Jowett thought that Anne's reference to deformity 'glances only 
indirectly at' Richard's own condition (Shakespeare, 2000, 1.2.21, n.) 
whereas Antony Hammond was sure that Anne is 'describing Richard's 
own birth' and wondered whether she realizes that she is doing this 
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(Shakespeare, 1981, I,2.23, n.). Without speculating about the contents 
of Anne's mind, we can say for sure that 160 lines earlier (about 8 min-
utes of stage time) Richard called himself 'deformed, unfinished ... half 
made up' (1.1.20-1), so the audience hears Anne cursing Richard with 
having a child like himself. King Leal' pronounces the same curse on his 
daughter Gonoril: 
LEAR If she must teem, 
Create her child of spleen, that it may live 
And be a thwart disnatured torment to her. 
Let it stamp wrinkles in her brow of youth, 
With cadent tears fret channels in her cheeks, 
Turn all her mother's pains and benefits 
To laughter and contempt, that she may feel -
That she may feel 
How sharper than a serpent's tooth it is 
To have a thankless child. 
(History of King Lear, IV.268) 
Viewed as a parenting strategy, Gonoril's selfishness defeats itself and 
the Golden Rule is upheld, not synchronically but diachronically over 
the generations. 
Later Lear realizes a layer of further potential reciprocity: what if 
he is subject to the same curse he made upon Gonoril? That is to say, 
might not Gonoril herself be a deserved punishment to him just as he 
wishes her child to be a deserved punishment to her? The sight of Edgar 
prompts this thought: 
LEAR What, has his daughters brought him to this pass? 
(To Edgar) Couldst thou save nothing? Didst thou give 
them all? 
FOOL Nay, he reserved a blanket, else we had been all shamed. 
LEAR (to Edgat) 
Now all the plagues that in the pendulous air 
Hang fated o'er men's faults fall on thy daughters! 
KENT He hath no daughters, sir. 
LEAR Death, traitor! Nothing could have subdued nature 
To such a lowness but his unkind daughters. 
(To Edgar) Is it the fashion that discarded fathers 
Should have thus little mercy on their flesh? 
Judicious punishment: 'twas this flesh begot 
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Those pelican daughters. 
(History of King Lear, 
11.56-68) 
Leal' comes to realize the errors of his ways, and in this regard we may 
usefully contrast him with the childless king Richard III. Richard has 
hopes to start his own line of monarchs, but his imagery of generation 
runs precisely counter to the principle of transgenerational correction 
I have been outlining. Richard seems to think that by generation he will 
undo his crimes rather than be called to account for them: 
QEEN ELIZABETH 
KING RICHARD 
Yet thou didst kill my children. 
But in your daughter's womb I bury them, 
Where, in that nest of spicery, they will breed 
Selves of themselves, to your recomfiture. 
(Richard III, IV.4.353-6) 
The childless Macbeth is much like Richard in brutally hacking his way 
to the throne only to find that it gives little joy without a child to pass 
it on to. Indeed, we may suppose that these kings are able to be bmtal 
because they are childless: had they to face the transgenerational con-
sequences of passing on these traits they would learn that selfishness is 
self-defeating. In their introduction, the editors of this volume sketch 
Andy Mousley's defence of humanism's inte11'0gations of 'how to live?', 
and here is a concrete example in Shakespeare's suggestion that the 
facts of life militate against anti-social behaviour. Perhaps goodness, like 
freedom, evolves (Dennett, 2003 a). 
The last plays of Shakespeare's career are especially concerned with rela-
tions between the generations. In The Winter's Tale, Paulina presents the 
new-born baby Perdita to Leontes and remarks on its likeness to him: 
PAULINA It is yours, 
And might we lay th' old proverb to your charge, 
So like you 'tis the worse. Behold, my lords, 
Although the print be little, the whole matter 
And copy of the father ... 
And thou good goddess Nature, which hast made it 
So like to him that got it, if thou hast 
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The ordering of the mind too, 'mongst all colours 
No yellow in't, lest she suspect, as he does, 
Her children not her husband's. 
(The Winter's Tale, II.3.96-108) 
Paulina means to show Leontes that he was wrong to suspect that the 
baby is another's child. But, having asserted that the baby is like its 
father, Paulina must hope that Perdita is unlike her father in one quality 
at least: that she is not yellow (the colour of jealousy) lest she think that 
her children are not her own. This is of course absurd, since the uneven 
burden of sexual reproduction affords women one certainty: they can at 
least be sure that the children they give birth to are their own. 
Even if heritable, Leontes's jealousy could not be transmitted down 
the female line, as Paulina appears to recognize as she says this. The 
Variorum edition of the play cites a number of critics who regard 
this absurdity as intentional illogic on Paulina's palt, meant to show 
Leontes his own illogic (Shakespeare, 200S, Through Line Numbering 
(TLN) , 1029-30, n.). On the other hand one might argue that this is 
unintentionally inflammatory and that, having his attention drawn to 
the certainty of motherhood, Leontes might feel the pain of paternal 
uncertainty all the more keenly. From the point of view of natural 
ethics - the kind of Gaian self-regulation that Shakespeare is thinking 
about - Paulina seems to have put her finger on a problem, since trans-
generational relations cannot visit Leontes's disorder upon him in the 
way that they can revisit Gonoril's ingratitude upon her. 
The neo-Darwinian approach to generation distinguishes our ideas 
from those of the high Enlightenment, and when allied to Lovelock's 
Gaia hypothesis the effect is that long-standing certainties about the 
place of humankind in the universe are transformed in ways that phi-
losophers are only beginning to appreciate. According to N. Katherine 
Hayles, the break that marks the transition to a posthuman condition 
occurred with the mathematical demonstrations that information could 
be measured as a quantity distinct from the medium conveying it, and 
that a machine could exhibit complex homeostasis by using informa-
tion about itself to regulate its own performance (Hayles, 1999). For 
Hayles, the humanist subject invented by the Enlightenment depended 
on an untenable Cartesian distinction between the body and the 
unembodied mind, and the posthumanist subject is in danger of aban-
doning the body altogether. The human characteristic we value most is 
consciousness, which impresses us much more than the (also complex) 
capacity to catch a fast-moving ball while running or to digest food, 
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and consciousness she argues - following Antonio Damasio (1995) - is 
embodied. Thus 'Human mind without human body is not human 
mind' (Hayles, 1999, p. 246). 
In this, however, Hayles's own anthropocentrism distorts the argu-
ment, for the humanist subject of the Enlightenment is just as effectively 
decentred in the new ecological approach that finds in the wider Earth 
systems (the movements of energy and chemicals in ocean currents, wind 
and weathering) the homeostatic processes that we once thought were 
characteristics peculiar to life. Hayles's posthuman condition in which a 
hard distinction between mechanical and living processes breaks down 
is also the early modern condition and was familiar to Shakespeare. 
Indeed, we might even say that Hayles is premature, for there are impor-
tant ways in which the now-dominant neo-Darwinian approach to life 
might be an oversimplification regarding the distinction, first made by 
August Weismann, between the genetic information, akin to recipes, 
passed down the generations by sex, the so-called germ line, and the 
bodies built from these recipes, the so-called somatic line. According to 
Weismann the latter cannot affect the form: an individual's genes are 
in no way modified by its behaviour. In fact, it seems that the gelID line 
is not quite so isolated from the somatic line as would be suggested by 
the analogy with information and media. 
Work on epigenetics and imprinting, in which the expression of 
genes may be conditioned by the sex of the parent from which they 
are inherited (or, more controversially, conditioned by the experiences 
of the parent), suggests that genetic data are not entirely isolated 
inside their chromosomes. While this does not amount to a return 
to Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck's notion of inheritance in which each 
generation's particulalities (the iron smith's large biceps, the bicycle-
courier's powerful calves) are passed on to descendents (the view that 
Weismann overturned), it suggests interactions that blur the germ/soma 
distinction. The idea that maternal experiences during gestation affect 
a foetus has a long tradition and of course emerges in Shylock's story of 
Laban's trick with his uncle's sheep (The Merchant of Venice, 1.3.89) and 
in Edmund's conviction that his fierce personality was imprinted on 
him by the passionate sex enjoyed by his parents when they made him 
(The History ofKil1g Lear 2.10-15). 
A particular kind of transgenerational relationship, parent-child 
incest, is the special focus of the last plays. In Pericles, Antiochus has 
corrupted the normal linear fanning out of family trees by fulfilling 
in himself the functions of father and husband. This turning in upon 
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itself of the family is extended so that Antiochus also becomes, as 
Pericles puts it, 'both a father and a son' (1.170), which peculiar claim 
we will return to shortly. Marina performs a similar turning inward of 
family relations when she revives Pericles from his swoon: 'Thou ... 
begett'st him that did thee beget' (21.183). The widespread taboo 
against sexual incest in almost all cultures has its biological origins in 
the genetic binarism of allele pairs in the human chromosome, one 
half of which came from the mother and one from the father. Many 
traits, including potential diseases, may be canied by an individual 
without being expressed because only one of the two alleles codes for 
that trait; the recessive allele has no effect because of the dominance 
of its partner that does not code for the trait. Such a recessive trait will 
be expressed only when both alleles at a given gene-locus code for it, 
which rarely happens when unrelated individuals mate. But because 
a brothel' and sister or a parent and child share SO per cent of their 
genes they are quite likely to have the same recessive allele at a given 
point in their genomes. The children of their incestuous mating are 
quite likely to inherit the recessive allele from both parents, which is 
the condition required for the recessive trait to be expressed. Children 
born of incestuous mating are for this reason much more likely than 
others to have genetically inherited diseases, which is what the incest 
taboo exists to prevent. 
Rather than being a cultural phenomenon, the incest taboo is a 
genetically determined behaviour that has been naturally selected: 
genes which make a parent and child, 01' a brothel' and sister, revolted 
by the thought of sex with one another are likely to do better in the 
centuries-long evolutionary competition than genes that do not. The 
latter genes are more likely to find themselves in unhealthy infants 
who die of genetically inherited disease before adulthood, and hence 
are less likely to get passed on to the next generation. Natural selec-
tion exhibits self-regulation, homeostasis, across the generations, and 
this offered Shaksespeare a model for his compulsive reworkings of 
self-healing family relationships - siblings forgiving parents and one 
another - in his last plays. Genes that do better by raising a taboo 
against incest need to give individuals a way of determining their 
consanguinity, and the most obvious way is to make individuals able 
to recognize their relations in order to avoid having sex with them. 
When a genealogy is drawn as a family tree, the incest taboo oper-
ates to promote the fanning out of lines of descent and to prevent 
the formation of genetically closed loops of relative-sex which are 
comparatively sterile because the resulting children have an increased 
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propensity to die before adulthood. The family tree of a recurrent 
incestuous relationships would tend towards a denuded bough, its 
branches withering from disease. 
Pericles's sexual desire for the daughter of Antioch is articulated in 
arboreal terms: 'To taste the fruit of yon celestial tree' (1.64). It is not 
clear if the daughter is the fruit and her father the celestrial tree, or 
perhaps she is the tree and the fruit is the sexual enjoyment of her. 
Her father, however, calls her 'this fair Hesperides, / With golden fruit' 
(1.70-1) which metaphor casts his daughter as a living contradiction, 
since she is the object of men's desire and simultaneously the guardian 
of that object. The riddle Pericles has to solve is written from the mute 
daughter's point of view ('I am ... ') and, as riddles often are, it is based 
on an apparent contradiction: 
PERICLES I am no viper, yet I feed 
On mother's flesh which did me breed. 
I sought a husband, in which labour 
I found that kindness in a father. 
He's father, son, and husband mild; 
I mother, wife, and yet his child. 
How this may be and yet in two, 
As you will live resolve it you. 
Sharp physic is the last. 
(Pericles 1.107-15) 
Even once this is solved as being about incest, the problem of the riddle 
is not entirely eliminated, since although we can see how her incestu-
ous father would be her father and husband, it remains unclear why 
he would be her Ison'. Equally mysterious is why she thinks herself not 
only his wife and child but also his Imother'. Parallel phrasing occurs in 
Pericles' soliloquy after Antiochus leaves: 
PERICLES Where now you're both a father and a son 
By your uncomely claspings with your child -
Which pleasures fits a husband, not a father -
And she, an eater of her mother'S flesh, 
By the defiling of her parents' bed, 
And both like serpents are, who though they feed 
On sweetest flowers, yet they poison breed. 
(Pericles 1.170-6) 
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Here Antiochus paradoxically becomes his own son and his daughter a 
consumer of her mother's flesh. 
The pOint of the paradox emerges if we draw a family tree and consider 
how incest breaks its conventions by generating loops of inbreeding. In 
the drawing of pedigrees - the form of family trees Shakespeare would 
have been familiar with, having had to produce one to apply for a patent 
of gentility in 1597 - horizontal lines link mates and vertical lines are 
used to link parents and their offspring, as in Figure 4.1. 
In such a schema there is no simple way to represent incest. One 
possibility is a loop (see Figure 4.2). 
This requires an additional directionality that the orthogonal tree 
structure is not supposed to possess: a slanted line representing sex with 
an offspring. Alternatively, the individual occupying the position of 
mate and offspring can be repeated (see Figure 4.3). 
A family tree that should fan out is made by incest to fold back on 
itself, or else it reqUires contradictory self-division, as in the daugh-
ter of Antiochus being both the fruit and the guardian of that fruit. 




AoI'och" T WlI. of Anll"h" 
Daughter of Antiochus 
AOIIO'h~ Wif. of Aolloch" 
Daughter of Antiochus 
Daughter of Antiochus - Antiochus T Wife of Antiochus 
Daughter of Antiochus 
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as 'dangling apricots' is fully expressed in the celebrated Gardening 
Scene (IlI.4) in Richard II and in Richard of Gloucester's 'I love the tree 
from whence thou sprang'st, / Witness the loving kiss I give the fruit' 
(Richard Duke of York, V.7.31-2). Sterility is a common consequence of 
inbreeding, and Pericles' impresa of a denuded bough green only at 
the top (the lower branches being dead) might stand for his avoidance 
of this evil. Antiochus calls Pericles a tree ('so fair a tree / As your fair 
self', 1.157-8) and Pericles fears that his life may be 'cropped' (1.184). 
Moreover, Pericles thinks of himself as one of that topmost class in a 
hierarchical social structure which protects the lower branches: 
PERICLES Our men [will] be vanquished ere they do reSist, 
And subjects punished that ne'er thought offence, 
Which care of them, not pity of myself, 
Who am no more but as the tops of trees 
Which fence the roots they grow by and defend them, 
Makes both my body pine and soul to languish, 
And punish that before that he would punish. 
(Pericles 2.27-33) 
The play's arboreal imagery cal'1'ies this double sense of diachronic 
generational fanning out over time and of synchronic social order. As 
a top branch, Pericles fears that Antiochus, 'To lop that doubt' (that 
Pericles will broadcast his sin), will cut him offi lopping means cutting 
off branchesi and other uses (such as cutting off heads or limbs, here as 
in the Gardening Scene in Richard II) are figuratively derived from this 
primary sense. 
The avoidance of incest is a purpose of many social practices which 
are, at root, driven by the genetic imperative to avoid harmful recessive 
genes meeting at the same locus in the genotype. The means by which 
organisms avoid incest is the ability to recognize their Siblings, offspling 
and parents, and distinguish them from others with whom they may 
mate. Pericles, like The Winter's Tale and C)'/nbeline, is much concerned 
with this ability to distinguish, and it gives us reason to reconsider the 
rejection of the categorization that calls these plays the Romances or, 
still more neutrally yet also being resisted (McMullan, 2007, pp. 65-126), 
the Late Plays. Thaisa does not even know if she has a daughter, the 
shipboard delivery being somehow forgotten: 
THAIS A That I was shipped at sea 
I well remember, ev'n on my eaning time, 
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But whether there delivered, by th' holy gods 
I cannot rightly say. 
(Pericles 14.4-7) 
She does not know it, but the child was a girl so there is no danger of 
their later meeting and incestuously mating. But Pericles does indeed 
meet Marina without knowing who she is, and his language upon 
recognizing her invokes precisely the contradictory self-parenting lan-
guage of Antiochus and his daughter: 'Thou that begett'st him that did 
thee beget' (21.183). 
The genetic pressure not to commit incest unknowingly is at least 
part of the motivation unconsciously driving Pericles' and Marina's 
tense consideration of the means by which identity might be deter-
mined, as with her 'Is it no more / To be your daughter than to say my 
mother's name?' (21.196-7) which might carry the additional sense of 
'is mentioning your wife enough to stop you thinking of me sexually?' 
In the source for Shakespeare's play The Winter's Tale, Robert Greene's 
Pal1dosto, the father Pandosto unwittingly and extensively woos his lost 
daughter Fawnia and even threatens to rape her if she will not yield to 
him (Greene, 1588, F4r-G3v). This part of the plot Shakespeare attenu-
ated but did not excise in his version of the story: 
FLORIZEL 
LEONTES 
At your request 
My father will grant precious things as trifles. 
Would he do so, I'd beg your precious mistress, 
Which he counts but a trifle. 
(The Winter's Tale, V.1.220-3) 
Incest also lies just beneath the surface of Cymbeline in the strong 
affection of Guiderius and Arviragus for their sister Imogen which only 
her disguise suppresses: 'Were you a woman, youth, / I should woo hard' 
(II1.6.66-7). Indeed, read as the product of a culture that seemingly 
understood (as we would not) Gertrude's mal1'iage to her dead husband's 
brother Claudius to be a kind of incest in Ham let, the avoidance of sibling 
incest is also the opening problem of Cymbeline since the king wished 
his daughter to marry his new queen's son (1.1.4-6). This unwanted 
marriage would have been a kind of grafting following the 'lopping' of 
Cymbeline's rightful male heirs, Guiderius and Arviragus, who at the 
end are again 'jointed to the old stock' as the prophecy handed down 
by Jupiter requires (V.3.236, V.4.441-2). It takes passionate complaints 
and overt threats from the ghosts of his parents and siblings to wring 
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this rectification of Posthumus' wrongs from the negligent foster-father 
Jupiter ('Thou orphans' father art', V.3.134), as we should expect since 
Shakespeare's last plays are so insistently concerned with the correction 
of trans generational wrong. 
An eco-critic might be expected to stress the cyclical nature of time 
in these plays, and their use of myths of regeneration to suggest that 
nature gathers in all with its recurrent return to a starting point. 
However, it is at least as useful to attend to their dramatizations of 
self-regulation (homeostasis) achieved by transgenerational correction 
in which bad behavioural traits inherited by offspring plague the per-
petrator. Shakespeare would seem, then, not only to have anticipated 
the Gaian model of a vitally alive Earth, but also the role of heredity in 
the evolution of morality as described by Frans de Waal, Daniel Dennett 
and Richard Joyce among others (Flack and De Waal, 2000j Dennett, 
2003aj De Waal, 2004j Joyce, 2006). Of course he anticipated neither of 
those thingsj rathel', unencumbered by the sharp distinction of matter 
and mind that dominated Enlightenment science he (rightly, we now 
know) assumed that the mechanical and the organic lie along a contin-
uous spectrum, or chain of being. Like his contemporaries, Shakespeare 
had insights that we would call posthumanist. 
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1. All quotations of Shakespeare are from Shakespeare (1989). 
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